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The gold standard was a key factor behind the Great Depression, but why did it produce such an intense
worldwide deflation and associated economic contraction?  While the tightening of U.S. monetary
policy in 1928 is often blamed for having initiated the downturn, France increased its share of world
gold reserves from 7 percent to 27 percent between 1927 and 1932 and effectively sterilized most
of this accumulation.  This “gold hoarding” created an artificial shortage of reserves and put other
countries under enormous deflationary pressure.  Counterfactual simulations indicate that world prices
would have increased slightly between 1929 and 1933, instead of declining calamitously, if the historical
relationship between world gold reserves and world prices had continued. The results indicate that
France was somewhat more to blame than the United States for the worldwide deflation of 1929-33.













  A large body of economic research has linked the gold standard to the length and severity 
of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
1  The gold standard’s fixed-exchange rate regime 
transmitted financial disturbances across countries and prevented the use of monetary policy to 
address the economic crisis.  This conclusion is supported by two compelling observations:  
countries not on the gold standard managed to avoid the Great Depression almost entirely, while 
countries on the gold standard did not begin to recover until after they left it.
2    
  While the link between the gold standard and the Great Depression is widely accepted, it 
begs the question of how the international monetary system produced such a monumental 
economic catastrophe.  Structural flaws in the post-World War I gold standard and the fragility 
of international financial stability are often blamed for the problems of the period.  However, it is 
not clear why such factors should have necessarily led to the massive price deflation experienced 
between 1929 and 1933 and the enormous economic difficulties that followed.  In particular, 
there was no apparent shortage of gold in the 1920s and 1930s - worldwide gold reserves 
continued to expand - so it is not obvious why the system self-destructed and produced such a 
cataclysm.   
                                                 
1 See Choudhri and Kochin (1982), Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Temin (1989), 
Eichengreen (1992), and Bernanke (1995), among many other works.   
2 In terms of countries that were not on the gold standard, Spain and China stand out as 
examples.  Because countries on the gold standard chose to leave it at different times – the 
United Kingdom in 1931, the United States in 1933, and France in 1936 – there is sufficient 
variation in country experiences to identify this relationship. 2 
 
To explain the disaster, contemporary observers and economic historians have pointed to 
the policies followed by central banks.  The standard explanation for the onset of the Great 
Depression is the tightening of U.S. monetary policy in early 1928 (Friedman and Schwartz 
1963, Hamilton 1987).  The increase in U.S. interest rates attracted gold from the rest of the 
world, but the gold inflows were sterilized by the Federal Reserve so that they did not affect the 
monetary base.  This forced other countries to tighten their monetary policies as well, without the 
benefit of a monetary expansion in the United States.  From this initial deflationary impulse 
came currency crises and banking panics that merely reinforced the downward spiral of prices.  
The United States deserves blame for starting the vicious cycle in the view of many economists.  
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 360) argue that “the United States was in the van of the 
movement and not a follower.”
3  Similarly, Eichengreen (1992, 222) states that “events in 
America were directly responsible for the slowdown in other parts of the world.”   
  However, what often frequently overlooked - or mentioned only in passing - is the fact 
that France was doing almost exactly the same thing.  In fact, France was accumulating and 
sterilizing gold reserves at a much more rapid rate than the United States.  Contemporary 
observers then and scholars of the Great Depression today have been aware of this fact, but it 
still remains a relatively neglected factor whose importance has not been fully appreciated.   
  Some scholars of French monetary history have even concluded that France deserves 
more blame than the United States for the world’s increasing monetary stringency in the late 
                                                 
3  “The international effects were severe and the transmission rapid, not only because the 
gold-exchange standard had rendered the international financial system more vulnerable to 
disturbances, but also because the United States did not follow gold-standard rules,” Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963, 361) note.  “We did not permit the inflow of gold to expand the U.S. money 
stock.  We not only sterilized it, we went much further.  Our money stock moved perversely, 
going down as the gold stock went up. . . . The result was that other countries not only had to 
bear the whole burden of adjustment but also were faced with continued additional disturbances 
in the same direction, to which they had to adjust.” 3 
 
1920s and early 1930s.  Johnson (1997, 147) contends that “while the United States did little to 
hinder the decline in world prices, especially after 1928, French policy can be charged with 
directly causing it.”
4   “That French gold policy aggravated the international monetary 
contraction from 1928 to 1932 is beyond dispute,” Mouré (2002, 180) maintains. “The 
magnitude and timing of French gold absorption from mid-1928 to 1930 imposed a greater 
constraint on systemic monetary expansion than the gold accumulation in the United States 
during the same period.”  Even Milton Friedman later revised his view on the origins of the 
Great Depression and wrote that France also deserved some responsibility for its occurrence.
5   
  Unfortunately, there is almost no quantitative evidence on the relative strength of 
deflationary forces emanating from the United States and France due to the withdrawal of gold 
from the rest of the world.  Eichengreen (1990) finds that U.S. monetary gold stocks were three 
times and French gold stocks nearly five times that predicted based on estimated central-bank 
reserve demand from a cross section of countries.  If the U.S. and French shares had been at their 
predicted levels, the gold reserves of other countries could have doubled and, “assuming that 
                                                 
4 As Johnson notes, “Beginning in 1929, the price declines were triggered by the rapid 
concentration of gold in a small number of central banks, where it was partly or entirely 
sterilized (that is, the increase in reserves was not permitted correspondingly to increase the 
amount of currency or deposits).  The Federal Reserve drew large amounts of gold from abroad 
starting in early 1929 and continuing through the summer of 1931, which contributed to the 
deflationary process; but this movement was exceeded by a larger amount flowing concurrently 
to the Bank of France.  In addition, the gold inflow to France began earlier and persisted after the 
flow to the United States was reversed.”   
 
5  After re-reading the memoirs of the Emile Moreau, the governor of the Bank of France, 
Friedman (1991, xii-xiii) said that he “would have assessed responsibility for the international 
character of the Great Depression somewhat differently” than he did originally in his Monetary 
History with Anna Schwartz, namely by laying blame on France as well.  Both the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of France “were determined to prevent inflation and accordingly both 
sterilized the gold inflows, preventing them from providing the required increase in the quantity 
of money. . . . France’s contribution to this process was, I now realize, much greater than we 
treated it as being in our [Monetary] History.”   
 4 
 
central banks were concerned to retain some proportion between their reserves and domestic 
liabilities,” Eichengreen concludes, “this redistribution of reserves would have provided 
considerable scope for an expansion of money supplies.”  Sumner (1991) uses a decomposition, 
rather than the estimated relationships and counterfactual analysis employed here, to find that 
central bank demand for monetary gold had a major impact of the world price level between 
1926 and 1932.  Although he does not focus on France in particular, his conclusions are 
consistent with this paper’s findings and will be discussed below. Bernanke and Mihov (2000) 
also decompose national price movements due to changes in the money supply to components 
such as changes in the money multiplier, cover ratios, reserve to gold ratios, and the stock of 
gold. They conclude that the maldistribution of gold across countries and the sterilization of gold 
were broadly responsible for the early stages of the deflationary epoch, but they do not focus on 
the broader international consequences of France’s policies.   
  This paper revisits the origins of the Great Depression to highlight the key role played by 
France.  After examining France’s monetary policy in the late 1920s, particularly its gold 
accumulation and sterilization policy, the paper estimates a simple model of the relationship 
between world prices and the world stock of monetary gold between 1875 and 1924.  An out-of-
sample forecast of the price level between 1925 and 1933 based on the actual changes in gold 
reserves suggests that, had the historical relationship between gold and prices continued, world 
prices would be expected to rise somewhat instead of declining 42 percent.   
  The paper then calculates how much gold would have been freed up if the United States 
and France had kept only enough to cover their actual liabilities at their 1928 cover ratios.  By 
this measure, both countries held excess gold equivalent to 6 percent of the world gold stock in 
1929 and 12 percent in 1930-32.  While the United States and France contributed equally to the 5 
 
effective reduction in the world gold stock in 1929 and 1930, France was almost entirely 
responsible for the effective reduction in 1931 and 1932.  The fact that the two countries kept 
such a large proportion of the world’s gold stock inert and withdrawn from world circulation in 
1929 and 1930 directly explains half of the massive worldwide deflation in 1930 and 1931 and is 
indirectly responsible for part of the remainder.  Finally, an appendix surveys the views of a 
number of economists – Gustav Cassel, Allyn Young, and John Maynard Keynes – who 
anticipated many of these problems and warned of the dangers that would arise if central banks 
(France’s in particular) began accumulating gold reserves without monetizing them.   
  These results support the view that France played a key role in bringing about the Great 
Depression.  While France’s role is sometimes acknowledged (usually briefly, if at all, however), 
economic historians have traditionally focused on the United States.  Because of the country’s 
smaller size, the impact of French policies is often believed to have been much smaller than the 
United States.
6  Yet these findings suggest that the French role deserves much greater 
prominence than it has thus far received for having transmitted a tightening of monetary policy 
to other countries and thus beginning the worldwide deflationary spiral. 
 
The Controversy about France’s Monetary Policy, 1928-1932 
  Many of the international monetary difficulties of the late 1920s can be traced to the 
decisions made to resume the gold standard in the mid-1920s after World War I.  The Genoa 
conference of 1922 established guidelines (unenforceable ones, however) for the reconstructed 
gold standard.  One concern at the time was that there would be insufficient new gold production 
to keep up with the growing demand for gold, and thereby result in deflation.  Sweden’s Gustav 
                                                 
6  As Temin (1989, 22) writes: “American gold holdings were larger than those of the 
French, and the American influence on events was larger.” 6 
 
Cassel was the leading economist who warned of an impending shortage of gold and the 
possibility of worldwide price deflation.  Based on historical experience, he concluded that the 
world stock of monetary gold had to increase by about three percent a year to keep up with 
commercial activity and the growing demand for gold and thereby maintain the existing level of 
world prices.  If the monetary gold stock grew more than 3 percent, world prices would increase; 
if the monetary gold stock grew less than 3 percent, world prices would fall.
7   
  Cassel and others believed that world gold production was slowing and that this was a 
cause for concern because of the problems associated with deflation.  He also thought that there 
would be higher demand for gold after the war because central banks had to support a larger base 
of liabilities due to the inflation that occurred during the war when the gold standard was 
suspended.  The wartime inflation meant that nominal liabilities could not be covered by the 
existing monetary base of gold, so countries would either have to reset their exchange rate 
parities or accumulate more gold reserves.  Fearful of the deflationary consequences of many 
central banks seeking to acquire more gold reserves at the same time, Cassel advocated a “gold-
exchange” standard in which foreign exchange holdings could also be used as central bank 
reserves to augment gold and thereby ensure stable prices.
8   
  The Genoa conference endorsed the view that central banks should economize on the use 
of gold by using foreign exchange as part of their reserve base.  Resolution No. 9 of the 
Conference recommended that central banks “centralise and coordinate the demand for gold, and 
so avoid those wide fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold which might otherwise result 
                                                 
7 Because the nominal price of gold was fixed in terms of national currencies, an increase 
in the supply of gold would manifest itself not in a lower price of gold, but in a higher price of all 
other commodities.  Similarly, an increase in the demand for gold would manifest itself in a 
lower price of all other commodities, not in a higher price of gold itself.   
8 Ralph Hawtrey, a leading monetary economist with the British Treasury who played a 
key role at the Genoa conference, shared many of these views. 7 
 
from the simultaneous and competitive efforts of a number of countries to secure metallic 
reserves.”  However, the Genoa resolutions were simply guidelines that could not be enforced.  
There was no agreement at all on the “rules” of gold standard game, particularly the idea that 
countries with increasing gold reserves should inflate their money supplies.  In addition, many 
countries, France foremost among them, were skeptical of using foreign exchange reserves (such 
as British pounds) as part of its reserve base, fearing that such a policy would be inflationary.  
  The reconstructed gold standard started off on the wrong foot in 1925 when Britain 
rejoined it at an exchange rate that overvalued the pound (Moggridge 1969).  This not only 
harmed the competitive position of export industries, but meant that the British balance of 
payments would remain in a fragile state until the country left gold in 1931.  The balance of 
payments weakness required the Bank of England to maintain a tight monetary policy to sustain 
the pound at its high level, keeping interest rates high and thereby diminishing domestic 
investment.  This kept economic growth in check and made it difficult for Britain to reduce its 
already high level of unemployment.   
  These problems were compounded in 1926 when France, after enduring a traumatic bout 
of inflation in 1924-26, stabilized the franc at an undervalued rate (Sicsic 1992).  France also 
made two other key policy decisions: it rejected the British idea of a gold-exchange standard and 
chose to hold gold alone as part of its central bank reserves, and it decided to prevent any return 
of inflation by sterilizing gold inflows to prevent them from increasing domestic prices.
9   France 
codified this set of policies with the Monetary Law of June 1928.  This law officially restored 
                                                 
9 As Mouré (2002, 188-89) notes:  “The attitude of the Bank of France exemplified the 
asymmetry and the deflationary bias of the gold standard.  The bank rejected the gold exchange 
standard as a dilution of the gold standard that promoted an over-expansion of credit . . . The 
Bank of France set itself resolutely against measures to increase domestic monetary circulation 
and prices.” 8 
 
convertibility of the franc in terms of gold at the undervalued rate, prevented the Bank from 
accumulating foreign exchange reserves, and required the Bank of France to maintain gold 
reserves equal to cover 35 percent of liabilities (notes in circulation and demand deposits).
10     
  One of the main worries expressed by Cassel and acknowledged at the Genoa conference 
was that there would be a shortage of gold and deflation if new production of gold was 
insufficient to meet the growing demand for it.  As it happened, the forecasts of declining gold 
production were off the mark.  As Figure 1 shows, the supply of gold reserves continued to grow 
through the late 1920s and into the 1930s.  In fact, world gold reserves increased 19 percent 
between 1928 and 1933.  
  What changed, however, was the international distribution of those reserves.  Partly as a 
result of the undervaluation of the franc, the Bank of France began accumulate gold reserves at a 
rapid rate.  As Figure 2 shows, France’s share of world gold reserves soared from 7 percent in 
1926 to 27 percent in 1932.  By 1932, France held nearly as much gold as the United States, 
though its economy was only about a fourth of the size of the United States.  Together, the 
United States and France held more than sixty percent of the world’s monetary gold stock in 
1932. 
  The evolution of gold reserves in Figure 2 reveals much about the monetary policies in 
each country.  The United States lost reserves (relative to other countries) between 1926 and 
1928 due in part to large capital lending to Europe.  After the Federal Reserve tightened policy in 
early 1928, foreign lending dried up and the U.S. share of reserves stabilized in 1929 and 1930.  
                                                 
10 At the time, the gold cover ratio was 40 percent, or 63 percent with foreign exchange 
reserves (Mouré 1991, 47-48).  It was understood that 40 percent was considered to be the 
minimum cover ratio so that the 35 percent would not be approached. 9 
 
The United States began losing reserves to other countries again in 1931 and 1932, after Britain 
left the gold standard in late 1931.   
 
Figure 1: World Gold Reserves, 1925-1932 
 
 



























































  Between 1923 and 1926, France’s share of gold reserves was stable, and about the same 
as Britain’s.  However, after the de facto stabilization of the franc occurred in 1926 (codified in 
1928), France’s share of world gold reserves took off.  Its growth from 7 percent of world 
reserves in 1926 to 27 percent in 1932 is the astounding feature of this period.  The Bank of 
France promoted this accumulation by selling off its foreign exchange reserves and purchasing 
gold. By liquidating its holdings of British pounds, France put pressure on the Bank of England’s 
gold reserves and hence on British monetary policy.
11  
 





Source:  Hardy (1936, 93) 
 
                                                 
11 See Accominotti (2009) for a recent discussion of the Bank of France’s management of 








































  Meanwhile, the pressure on Britain due to the overvalued pound is also evident as its 
share of reserves gradually declined after 1925, and especially in 1931 when it faced large gold 
losses and was forced off the gold standard.    
  France’s stabilization in 1926 and America’s tightening of monetary policy in 1928 
combined to attract gold to these two countries at the expense of the rest of the world.  Table 1 
provides another look at the change in gold reserves during this period.  In December 1928, 
world gold reserves were 5 percent larger than they had been in December 1927; France 
accounted for 3 percent of the increase, the rest of the world 4 percent, while the United States 
lost 2 percent of the world stock.  The situation changed in 1929 when the United States joined 
France in absorbing most of the growth in gold reserves and then some, taking 3 percent of the 
world stock away from the rest of the world.  The same thing happened in 1930 as well.  In 1931, 
the world gold stock rose 3 percent, but France accumulated 8 percent, taking 2 percent of the 
world gold stock away from the United States and 3 percent away from the rest of the world.   
  The deflationary pressure that this redistribution of gold put on other countries is 
remarkable.  In 1929, 1930, and 1931, the rest of the world lost the equivalent of about 8 percent 
of the world’s gold stock, an enormous proportion – 15 percent – of the rest of the world’s 
December 1928 reserve holdings. 
  The cumulative effect is astounding.  In December 1932, world gold reserves were 24 
percent larger than they had been in December 1927.  However, France absorbed almost every 
ounce of the additional gold, leaving the rest of the world with no net increase.
12  The United 
                                                 
12 John Maynard Keynes (1932, 83) could not resist this biting remark:  “And, when the 
last gold bar in the world has been safely lodged in the Bank of France, that will be the 
appropriate moment for the German Government to announce that one of their chemists has just 
perfected the technique for making the stuff at 6d. an ounce.” 12 
 
States seems to have been less of a problem because it was not systematically accumulating gold 
throughout the period. 
 
Table 1: Gold Reserves: Percentage Change from Previous year  
 




Absorption by  
(percent of total world reserves) 
 
   United  States 
 
France Rest  of  World 
December 1928 
 
+5 -2  +3  +4 
December 1929 
 
+3 +2  +4  -3 
December 1930 
 
+6 +3  +5  -2 
December 1931 
 
+3 -2  +8  -3 
December 1932  +5  +0  +3  +3 
 
 




+18 +1  +21  -4 
December 1932  +24  +1  +24  -0 
 
 
Note: final three columns may not sum to first column due to rounding. 
 
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), pp. 544-545. 
 
  This massive redistribution of gold would not have been a problem for the world 
economy if the United States and France had been monetizing the gold inflows.  Then the gold 
inflows would have led to a monetary expansion in those countries, just as the gold outflows 
from other countries led to a monetary contraction elsewhere.  That would have been playing by 13 
 
the “rules of the game” of the classical gold standard.  However, there were no agreed-upon rules 
of the game in the interwar gold standard.  And both France and the United States were 
effectively sterilizing the inflows to ensure that they did not have an expansionary effect.
13  
  The sterilization is implicit in the cover ratios presented in Figure 3.  The cover ratio is 
the ratio of central bank gold reserves to its domestic liabilities (notes in circulation and demand 
deposits).  Once again, the change in France is astonishing in comparison to the other countries.  
As noted earlier, the Monetary Law of 1928 mandated the cover ratio of the Bank of France to be 
a minimum of 35 percent, although the Bank wanted a minimum of 40 percent in practice.  This 
is about where the cover ratio was in December 1928.  Of course, this was a lower bound and 
there was no maximum cover ratio beyond which the Bank was forbidden to go.  By 1930, the 
Bank of France cover ratio rose to over 50 percent.  In January 1931 it reached 55 percent; at this 
point the Bank of France considered but rejected a proposal to suspend its gold purchases 
(Mouré 2002, 188).  By 1932, the cover ratio had risen to the astounding level of nearly 80 
percent!  France was well on its way to having 100 percent money, in which all of the central 
bank liabilities would be backed one-for-one with gold in its vault. 
  The path of the U.S. cover ratio is also consistent with the previous discussion.  The 
cover rose in 1929 and 1930 as a result of the Federal Reserve’s tightening in 1928.  In those 
years the United States was accumulating gold and its cover ratio was increasing.  However, 
when the United States began to lose gold in 1931 and 1932, the cover ratio also fell.  Thus, the 
Federal Reserve’s policy was symmetric: it did not inflate when gold was coming in and it did 
not deflate when it lost gold reserves.  Once again, by this measure, U.S. policy is somewhat 
                                                 
13 Eichengreen (1986) examines France’s sterilization policy in detail. 14 
 
tighter in 1929 and 1930, but somewhat looser in 1931 and 1932, whereas France is consistently 
tight - and seemingly to a greater degree than the United States - throughout this period. 
  Meanwhile, Britain’s cover ratio was the lowest of the three and declined slightly as the 
Bank of England struggled to keep a hold of its existing gold reserves.  
 





Note: Data are for December of each year. 
 
Source: Calculated from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943). 
 
 
  While French policy was largely passive with respect to the gold inflows, the 
undervaluation of the franc in 1928 played a major role in generating the balance of payments 
surpluses that were driven by gold inflows.  French officials such as Rist (1931) argued that the 


































































encourage the gold movement.  Sicsic (1993) notes that the capital inflows arose from the 
repatriation of capital by French residents after the stabilization became credible.  Yet as Mouré 
(2002, 187) points out, this still created problems for the international financial system because 
even if all the gold coming back was repatriated capital, it had left the country without producing 
any decline in French gold reserves while it returned to France by delivering gold from the rest 
of the world. 
  French officials not only disclaimed responsibility for the gold inflows, they denied 
sterilizing gold.  Finance Minister Paul Reynaud (1933, 258) pointed out that new francs had 
been issued in almost equal value to the amount of gold accumulated between 1928 and 1932 “as 
is required by the gold standard system.”  (Reynaud failed to note that a decline in commercial 
banks deposits had largely offset the increase in note issue.)  In fact, a closer look at the balance 
sheet of the Bank of France indicates that it was not sterilizing in the classic sense of reducing 
domestic assets to offset an increase in foreign assets.  As Table 2 indicates, the Bank continued 
to accumulate domestic assets even as its foreign asset holdings grew.  The Bank’s total assets 
grew 29 percent between 1928 and 1932, although this understates the growth because the Bank 
did not treat foreign exchange as part of its monetary base; total assets of gold and domestic 
assets grew 102 percent.   
  And yet, despite this growth in the monetary base, the money supply was essentially 
unchanged over this period.  The implicit money multiplier dropped and offset the increase in 
high powered money. Figure 4 presents another depiction of France’s reserves of gold, gold and 
foreign exchange, and money supply (M2).  Simply put, the growth in the Bank’s total assets 
was not getting translated into the nation’s money and credit.   
   
Table 2: Bank of France’s Balance Sheet, 1928-32 
Millions of francs, end of December of each year 









 Gold  Foreign 
Exchange 
Total        
1928 
 
32.0 32.7 64.7 19.9  84.6  161.7  1.91 
1929 
 
41.7 25.9 67.6 22.4  90.0  161.5  1.80 
1930 
 
53.6 26.2 79.8 23.2  103.0  170.2  1.65 
1931  68.8 21.1 89.9 25.8  115.8  164.7  1.42 




+159 -86 +35 +10  +29  +1  -- 
 
Source:  Assets from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), pp. 641-642.  M2 from Patat and Lutfalla (1990), 
Table A2. 
 






Source:  Patat and Lutfalla (1990, Table A2) and Mouré (1991, 55-56). 
 
 
  To some extent, the falling money multiplier was beyond the direct control of the Bank of 
France.
14  As Eichengreen (1986) emphasizes, there were a variety of institutional and legal 
                                                 
14 Bernanke and Mihov (2000, 139-40, 148-150) note that “the falling money multiplier 
combined with the Bank of France’s movement from foreign exchange reserves to gold accounts 
for essentially the entire nullification of the effect of the gold inflows on the domestic money 
supply. . . given the French commitment to the gold standard,, and to exclusive reliance on gold 
reserves, the actions of the Bank of France are difficult to fault . . . [they] conducted policy 
almost entirely according to the ‘rules of the game’ because of the stability of the monetary base 
to international reserve ratio. . . . This is not to claim that French monetary policies were not bad, 
even disastrous, for the world as a whole: in particular, the large gold inflows induced by the 
conversion of foreign exchange and the switch by French citizens from deposits to currency put 
major pressure on other gold standard countries to tighten their monetary policies. However, the 
damage done by French policies lay to a much greater degree in the government’s choice of 




























reasons for the inability of France to translate its expanding gold reserves into the monetary 
supply.  Under the Monetary Law of 1928, the Bank of France was restricted in its ability to 
undertake open market operations to ease the monetary situation and slow the gold inflows.  
Government fiscal surpluses were deposited at the Bank of France and built up as idle balances 
because of the fear of monetization and inflation, as occurred before the 1926 stabilization.  The 
French banking system was also notoriously inefficient at transforming reserves into francs. 
Given the legal restrictions on the Bank of France and institutional environment, Eichengreen 
(1986) concludes that there were few policies (except open market operations, had that been 
available) that could have stopped the French gold accumulation.
15   
  Yet, even if it could have done more, French policymakers were not inclined to do 
anything much differently.  French officials were satisfied with the situation and did not see why 
any changes should be made.  Although the Bank of France only considered gold as part of its 
reserve base, its defenders pointed out that the composition of its reserves had simply shifted 
from foreign exchange to gold, so its total asset position had not grown as much as commonly 
thought.  Yet even including foreign exchange holdings, the Bank of France’s cover ratio grew 
sharply during this period.  
  In fact, France wanted to maintain a high cover ratio.  Despite the expanding reserve 
base, the Bank of France did not want to undertake any “inflationary” monetary policy and so it 
took measures to limit the impact of gold on monetary circulation. “It would have been 
                                                                                                                                                             
reserves – than in the Bank of France’s implementation of that regime.” 
 
15 Eichengreen (1986) argues that “France’s painful experience with inflation in the early 
1920s was directly responsible for the adoption of the stringent regulations which prevented the 
central bank from intervening to prevent the accumulation of gold.” He suggests that “viewing 
French attitudes in their historical context sheds more light on the actions of policymakers than 
do allegations of obstinacy or of failure to understand the workings of the international monetary 
system.” 19 
 
extremely imprudent of the Bank to put all its gold to work, even had that been possible,” 
Reynaud (1933, 258-60) argued.  “The Bank of France has the duty to be forearmed against the 
possibility of a sudden withdrawal of foreign funds. . . . It is the duty of the Bank of France to 
guard against this danger by maintaining, not a sterile gold reserve, but a margin of available 
credit, so that it may intervene at an opportune moment and so far as possible modify the effect 
produced by the withdrawal of foreign capital.”
16   
  Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate why France was viewed as a “gold sink” by contemporary 
observers.  As one might expect, French policy led it into conflict with British officials, who 
were well aware that France’s policy was making its own adjustment difficult in view of the 
overvalued pound. In January-February 1931, British officials consulted with their French 
counterparts to see if they could be moved from their monetary stance.  French officials insisted 
that the gold inflow demonstrated market confidence in its good policies, that they had done 
nothing deliberate to increase the gold inflow, and that there was nothing that they could do to 
stop it (Mouré 2002, 183-86, Boyce 1987, 296-99).  They put the burden on Britain to raise 
interest rates further if they wished to attract gold.  The French explanation failed to satisfy 
British officials.  As Ralph Hawtrey put it:  “We complain of the drain of gold because it tends to 
cause a monetary contraction here and in the rest of the world, and Monsieur Escallier’s reply is 
that we can prevent the drain of gold if we choose to effect a monetary contraction!” (Mouré 
1991, 63). 
                                                 
16  Reynaud (1933, 260) also tried to cast French policy in a favorable light in comparison 
to the Federal Reserve:  “Unlike the United States, the Bank of France has never tried to 
neutralize the influx of gold into France. It felt that such a policy, by maintaining artificial credit 
conditions, would actually have stimulated the import of gold and aggravated the monetary 
difficulties of other countries.” 20 
 
  France’s refusal to make any concessions infuriated many in Britain.  Financial journalist 
Paul Einzig (1931, vii) vehemently denounced French policy, arguing that it is “the French gold-
hoarding policy which brought about the slump in commodity prices, which in turn was the main 
cause of the economic depression; that it is the unwillingness of France to cooperate with other 
nations which has aggravated the depression into a violent crisis; and that her unwillingness to 
co-operate is still the principal obstacle to an economic recovery.”  Einzig contended that the 
gold reserves gave France political power that it could exploit; indeed, French officials made 
threats at various points to sell some of its foreign exchange holdings of certain countries to 
induce them to agree to French foreign policy objectives, although there is less evidence that 
such threats were used.
17   
  To conclude, there is a plausible case that French monetary policy was more problematic 
for the world than American monetary policy from 1928 to 1932.  Empirical evidence is needed 
to see if that is true. 
 
Gold and Prices, Reserves and Cover Ratios: A Counterfactual Assessment 
  Any assessment of the worldwide deflationary impact of U.S. and French monetary 
policies in the late 1920s requires a simple empirical framework for relating world prices to the 
underlying stock of monetary gold.  Cassel (1928), Kitchen (1930), and Warren and Pearson 
(1933, 80-81) all discussed how world commodity prices were influenced by changes in the 
world gold stock.  All emphasized the same result: that monetary stock of gold would have to 
increase about 3 percent per year to maintain stable world prices; if the monetary stock rose at a 
                                                 
17 Mouré (2002, 191) finds that “Bank of France records reveal no direct political motives 
at work; such motives seemed obvious, however, to critics seeking to explain the gold flow to 
France in 1930, and would be evident in central bank efforts to deal with the financial crises of 
1931.” 21 
 
slower rate, prices would fall; if the stock rose at a more rapid rate, prices would rise.  They 
showed this empirical regularity with an abundance of charts and tables (no regression analysis, 
of course) that depicted the world gold stock and a measure of world commodity prices dating 
back to the 1840s.  The most frequently used measure of world prices was the Sauerbeck-Statist 
index, a longest available series of world commodity prices that dated back well into the early 
nineteenth century. 
  In fact, consistent with the contentions of these early analysts, a simple empirical model 
performs reasonably well in explaining prices.  Let P be the level of wholesale prices (as 
measured by the Sauerbeck-Statist index) and G be the world’s stock of monetary gold.  Because 
changes in the stock of gold would affect prices with a lag, consider the following specification:  
∆ log P           ∆ l o g           
The constant term can be interpreted as the change in the price level if there was no growth in the 
supply of gold.  We would expect the estimate of alpha to be about -0.03, if Cassel and others 
were correct.  The coefficient β gives us the elasticity of the gold stock with respect to 
commodity prices.  Because the coefficient is akin to the money multiplier, we would expect our 
estimate of beta to be greater than one but less than three.  The estimate is related to the 
reciprocal of the world cover ratio; if the world cover ratio is 0.4, on average, then the gold-
money-price multiplier would be about 2.5. 
  This specification is completely supply-side driven and ignores the fact that a lower price 
level (i.e., a higher relative price of gold) should lead to an increase in production of gold.  
However, gold production is relatively inelastic in the short-run, particularly with respect to 
short-term, year-to-year price fluctuations.
18  Yet even over the longer run, Rockoff (1984) finds 
                                                 
18 As Sumner (1991, 383) notes: “changes in the supply of monetary gold could only 22 
 
that changes in gold supply prior to 1913 were largely determined by factors other than the price 
of gold.  
  Another issue is the length of lags to be considered.  Gold would not expected to have an 
immediate impact on prices, but the lag between its appearing in a central bank’s reserves and its 
being monetized to affect prices could be long and variable.  Cassel and others thought up to 
three to five years before changes in gold would pass through to prices.  In fact, in considering 
various specifications, the contemporaneous impact of gold is often insignificant or of the wrong 
sign, and additional lags beyond the second are insignificant.  The coefficient on the first lag is 
comparable to the sum of the coefficients in a distributed lag specification.  For simplicity, we 
will focus on the simple one-lag specification. 
  Table 3 reports the results from estimating this equation with the world monetary gold 
stock and wholesale price index data presented in League of Nations (1930, 82-84).
19  Column 1 
reports the estimates using annual data from 1840 to 1914 and finds that the constant term α is 
estimated to be -0.04 and β is estimated to be 1.16.  However, the coefficient on gold is likely to 
be biased because silver was also used as a monetary standard for much of the early part of this 
period.  Column 2 focuses on the period of the classical gold standard from 1875 to 1914.  The 
constant term is -0.04 and is statistically significant.  This finding supports Cassel’s contention 
that the demand for gold was growing at about three percent annually and therefore world gold 
supplies would need to expand at least that much to maintain prices.  The coefficient on the 
lagged change in the monetary gold stock is 1.5 and is statistically significant at the five percent 
level.  The coefficient indicates that a 10 percent increase in gold would translate into a 15 
                                                                                                                                                             
slightly reduce the impact of changes in gold-reserve ratios on the price level, at least in the 
short- to medium-term.”   
19 The Sauerbeck-Statist index after 1929 comes from Mitchell (1988). 23 
 
percent increase in wholesale prices in the subsequent year.  Column 3 estimates the same 
equation with dummy variables for each decade and finds a somewhat larger coefficient on gold. 
  Did the same relationship between gold and prices hold in the 1920s?  The gold standard 
was suspended during World War I and thereafter, so prices and gold became delinked.  Prices 
rose sharply during the war, and fell precipitously in 1921.  Column 4 shows the results from 
estimating the same equation for the period 1875 to 1924, but with dummy variables for World 
War I (1915-17), the postwar price decline (1921), and the early postwar period (1922-24).   
The coefficient on gold is slightly lower, at 1.38.  Column 5 repeats the regression but includes 
decade dummy variables, and the coefficient on gold is about 1.5.   If one extends the sample 
past 1924, however, the coefficient on gold drops precipitously.  This reflects that fact that the 
changes in world gold reserves were no longer getting translated into world prices.  This reflects 
the start of the malfunctioning of the interwar gold standard.   
  24 
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Note: HAC standard errors in parenthesis; * indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent 
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  The close historical relationship between the change in world gold reserves and the 
change in world prices in the subsequent year provides a basis for forecasting the path of prices 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s based on the actual change in the world’s monetary gold stock.  
The monetary gold stock grew 18 percent between 1928 and 1933, a compound annual rate of 
3.4 percent.  Despite the concerns about an insufficient supply of gold, there was no apparent 
shortage of monetary gold during this period.  As a result, world prices would have been 
forecasted to rise about 15 percent over this five year period.  Instead, world prices fell 42 
percent between 1928 and 1932.   
  Figure 5 shows actual world prices from 1875 to 1933, predicted world prices from 1875 
to 1924 (from equation 5 in Table 2), and the out-of-sample forecast of prices from 1925 to 
1933.  This illustrates the powerful deflationary shock that hit during this period.  It is very 
difficult to see how a price decline of this magnitude could have been anticipated based on the 
growing supply of gold during this period.
20  For some reason, the world’s monetary gold stock 
was not being translated into world prices.  The likely reason for this was the increased demand 
for gold by France and the sterilization of gold by France and the United States. 
 
  
                                                 
20  See Hamilton (1992) and Evans and Wachtel (1993) for evidence that the deflation 
was not anticipated. 26 
 














1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
Log of Prices















  The precise timing of the deflationary price shock is closely related to the changes in 
French and American monetary policies.  In most countries, wholesale prices were stable in the 
mid-1920s.  The world economy was doing reasonably well and, while there were the usual 
difficulties with reparations and the like, there was no obvious indication that the world could not 
muddle through -- until a powerful deflationary shock struck countries simultaneously in mid-
1929, as Figure 6 shows.  This suggests that something must have occurred in 1928 to bring 
about the changes in prices in 1929.  What happened in 1928 is the tightening of Federal Reserve 
policy coincided with the growing strength and importance of the French gold sink.  France’s 
policy had been a net drain on world gold reserves as early as 1926, but its effect had been offset 
by U.S. gold exports between 1926 and 1928, as noted earlier and pointed out by Sumner (1991).   
 
Figure 6:  Wholesale Prices, 1926-1932 























  The identification of monetary changes in 1928 as leading to price changes in 1929 is 
consistent with Gustav Cassel’s contemporary analysis of the situation.  Cassel was a member of 
a League of Nations delegation charged with studying the gold situation.
21  The report attributed 
the problems of 1929-32 to “maladjustments” and “disruptions” in the world economy as a result 
of World War I.  Cassel rejected this view and refused to sign the final report when it was issued 
in 1932.  In his dissenting note, Cassel argued that this vague formulation avoided any 
recognition that specific policy changes in France and the United States might have been 
responsible for the troubles.  Cassel (1932a, 74) stated that  
“the way in which the Gold Delegation presents the causes of the breakdown of the gold 
standard seems to me entirely unacceptable.  What we have to explain is essentially a 
monetary phenomenon, and the explanation must therefore essentially be of a monetary 
character.  An enumeration of a series of economic disturbances and maladjustments 
which existed before 1929 is no explanation of the breakdown of the gold standard.  In 
fact, in spite of existing economic difficulties, the world enjoyed up to 1929 remarkable 
progress.  What has to be cleared up is why the progress was suddenly interrupted.”   
  In other words, the question was why a deflationary shock suddenly appeared in mid-
1929 and why it hit so powerfully – and unrelentingly – over the next three years.  What 
happened, in Cassel’s view, was simply an increase in the monetary demand for gold from the 
United States and France that produced a “rise in the value of gold [i.e., reduction in world 
prices] of unparalleled violence.”  
                                                 
21 For political reasons, the report had to tip-toe around France’s policies (less so for the 
United States, which was not a member of the League and hence could not use pressure to vet 
the report). See Clavin and Wessels (2004). 29 
 
“The consequence was such a drain on the gold reserves of other countries as to cause the 
breakdown of the international gold-standard system.  The sudden increase in the value of 
gold meant a corresponding fall in the general level of commodity prices, the effect of 
which was a general distrust and unwillingness to invest savings in production and a 
widespread incapacity of debtors – private and public – to meet their obligations, causing 
a further destruction of confidence.”  
  The impact of the French and American monetary policies starting in 1928 can be 
assessed by calculating how much gold was sitting “inactive” in the vaults of the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of France.  Then the effect of this sterilized gold on world prices can be 
traced back using the regression coefficients presented in Table 3.  Given that the world 
economy seemed to be doing reasonably well in 1928, the year in which the Federal Reserve 
began to tighten monetary policy and the Bank of France officially began operating under the 
new Monetary Law, that year will be taken as a benchmark.
22   
  The key assumption will be that the two countries fix their cover ratio – the ratio of gold 
reserves to domestic liabilities (notes in circulation and demand deposits) – at their 1928 levels 
in subsequent years.  Letting G stand for the gold reserves and L for domestic liabilities, the 
reserve ratio “r” for the 1928 benchmark can be calculated as r28 = G28/L28, as depicted in Figure 
3.  The amount of excess gold held in 1929 can be calculated as G29 – r28·L29, where r28·L29 is the 
amount of gold required in 1929 to maintain the same 1928 cover ratio for the actual amount of 
outstanding liabilities in 1929.  This can be calculated for subsequent years in the same way. 
  Figure 7 presents the results graphically and reports the excess gold as a share of the 
world’s gold stock.  In 1929, the United States and France had “excess” and sterilized reserves 
                                                 
22 In addition, the balance sheet of the Bank of France is wholly different prior to the 
Monetary Law, making it difficult to use 1927 as a benchmark year. 30 
 
equivalent about 6 percent of the world’s gold stock, each accounting for about 3 percent.  This 
means that about 6 percent of the world’s gold stock was effectively withdrawn from world 
circulation and de-monetized.  That gold became “inactivated” in 1929 in the sense that it was 
held above what would have been required to maintain the 1928 cover ratio, given the actual 
outstanding liabilities in 1929.   Although France’s gold reserves grew much faster than the 
United States in 1929, at 30 percent versus 4 percent, the U.S. gold stock was much greater.  
Because the increase in the cover ratio was similar across the two countries, the absolute amount 
of the excess gold reserves was nearly identical.   
  In 1930, when the United States and France held about 60 percent of the world’s gold 
stock, they were sitting on (non-monetizing) about 11 percent of the world’s gold stock 
compared to 1928.  Once again, the impact of both countries was roughly the same, although the 
United States is slightly larger in its effect.  In 1931, once again about 11 percent of the world’s 
gold stock is unused, but this time the contribution is different; the United States has eased its 
policy whereas France accounts for about 80 percent of the excess.  (Recall that the United States 
had begun to lose gold reserves by this point, and its cover ratio had started to fall.)  In 1932, 
France is entirely responsible for the effective withdrawal of 13 percent of the world’s gold stock 
from circulation.  By this time, however, the gold standard had begun to disintegrate, with 
Britain and a host of other countries allowing their currencies to depreciate in late 1931.  The 
link between gold and prices was increasingly being severed. 
  In sum, U.S. and France exerted roughly equal deflationary pressure on the rest of the 
world in 1929 and 1930 and France exerted a much more deflationary impact in 1931 and 1932.  
Over the entire period from 1928 to 1932, France had a greater deflationary impact than the 31 
 
United States:  it could have released 13.7 percent of the world’s gold stock, while the United 
States could have released 11.7 percent, and still have maintained their 1928 cover ratios.   
 
 





Source: see text. 
 
 
  In his 1752 essay “Of Money,” David Hume remarked:  “If the coin be locked up in 
chests, it is the same thing with regard to prices, as if it were annihilated.” This analogy seems to 
apply to the American and French accumulation of gold during this period.  So what was the 
impact of the effective withdrawal of this gold from circulation on the world price level?  For 
this we can refer back to the regression coefficients from Table 3 indicating a 1 percent increase 
in the gold stock would increase world prices by 1.5 percent.  In 1929, the United States and 
France effectively withdrew 6 percent of the world’s gold stock from circulation.  This implies 









































year, world prices actually fell 17 percent.  In 1930, the United States and France increased the 
amount of gold that they were hoarding by 5 percentage points (11.4 – 6.4).  This implies that 
prices in 1931 should fall 7.6 percent (5 X 1.5), while in fact they fell 15.5 percent.  In 1931, 
there was an easing of this situation due to U.S. gold losses and a reduction in its cover ratio, but 
France made up for this by accumulating and sterilizing more gold.  By 1932 the impact on 
prices does not quite matter as much because many countries were off the gold standard by this 
point.  The link between gold and prices was increasingly being severed, and France could 
accumulate all the gold it wanted without affecting world prices as significantly.   
  From this simple exercise, we can conclude that the Federal Reserve and Bank of France 
directly account for about half of the 30 percent deflation experienced in 1930 and 1931.  Of 
course, once the deflationary spiral began, other factors began to reinforce it.  The most 
important factor was that growing insolvency (due to debt-deflation problems identified by 
Irving Fisher) contributed to bank failures, which in turn led to a reduction in the money 
multiplier as the currency to deposit ratio increased (Boughton and Wicker 1979).  However, 
these endogenous responses cannot be considered as independent of the initial deflationary 
impulse, and therefore U.S. and French policies can be held indirectly responsible for at least 
some portion of the remaining “unexplained” part of the price decline. 
  This calculation can be compared to Sumner (1991), whose accounting of the supply and 
demand for gold yields comparable results.  Sumner reports that, between December 1926 and 
December 1932, gold supply increased 26 percent and gold demand increased 63 percent, 
thereby producing a 37 percent fall in world prices.  Of the 63 percent increase in gold demand, 
31 percentage points (49 percent) arose from France, 14 percentage points (22 percent) arose 
from the United States, and 17 percentage points (29 percent) arose from the rest of the world.  33 
 
However, this demand includes private demand (currency) as well as central bank demand.  In 
terms of central bank demand, the Bank of France accounts for 17 percentage points of the 
increase in demand whereas the Federal Reserve was actually reducing its monetary demand for 
gold by 5 percentage points.   
  The findings of this paper are entirely consistent with Sumner’s (1991, 388) conclusion 
that “restrictive French monetary policy can explain much of the decrease in the world price 
level throughout the 1926-1932 period.”  
  
Conclusion 
  The standard account of the onset of the Great Depression usually begins with the Federal 
Reserve’s tightening of monetary policy in 1928.  However, the rapid accumulation and effective 
sterilization of gold reserves by the Bank of France deserves equal – if not greater – billing in the 
narrative.  The impact of the monetary policies of the two countries was equally significant in 
producing deflationary pressure in 1929 and 1930, while France became the dominant 
deflationary force in 1931 and 1932.   
  This paper provides a very simple explanation for the sudden onset of deflation in terms 
of changes in U.S. and French monetary policy around 1928.  Of course, declining prices do not 
necessarily imply declining output, yet recent research has shown that the Great Depression of 
the 1930s is somewhat unique in linking the two (Atkeson and Kehoe 2004, Bordo, Lane, and 
Redish 2004).  Hence, simply avoiding deflation during this period would likely have changed 
the course of world history.  One shudders to think of the historical ramifications of the policies 
pursued at this time.  As Robert Mundell (2000, 331) has speculated:  “Had the price of gold 
been raised in the late 1920’s, or, alternatively, had the major central banks pursued policies of 34 
 
price stability instead of adhering to the gold standard, there would have been no Great 
Depression, no Nazi revolution, and no World War II.”   35 
 
Appendix: Contemporary Analysis of the French Gold Situation 
  This paper has focused on the American and French sterilization of gold in the late 1920s 
and its deflationary consequences.  Several leading economists of the period, particularly Gustav 
Cassel and John Maynard Keynes, were well aware of the situation and warned of its adverse 
consequences.  This appendix provides a brief summary of contemporary views on the French 
gold situation.  
  The text noted that Cassel warned of an impending shortage of gold and the possibility of 
worldwide price deflation after World War I.  He continued to emphasize this thinking 
throughout the 1920s.  In his May 1928 lectures at Columbia University, Cassel (1928, 44) 
argued that “the great problem before us is how to meet the growing scarcity of gold which 
threatens the world both from increased demand and from diminished supply.” While little could 
be done about the projected slowing growth in the supply of gold, Cassel proposed to remedy the 
imbalance by restricting the monetary demand for gold:  “only if we succeed in doing this can 
we hope to prevent a permanent fall of the general price level and a prolonged and worldwide 
depression which would inevitably be connected with such a fall in prices.”  
  Cassel’s fears about an insufficient supply of gold were misplaced: as we have seen, the 
supply of monetary gold continued to expand through the early 1930s.  There was no shortage of 
gold supplies in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but his fears about the increasing monetary 
demand for gold were entirely realized.   
  The increase in central bank demand for gold was soon evident.  In January 1929, Allyn 
Young (1929) decried the hoarding of gold by central banks, saying that it was “an expression of 
financial nationalism” and was “inexplicable on any rationale grounds.”  He stated that “there is 36 
 
plenty of gold” and that “production and trade can grow without there being a general fall in 
prices, if only the central banks of the world will permit it.”  Young concluded:  
“No thinking person wants another period of inflation.  But the high-gold-reserve-ratio 
fetish ought not to have the influence which it now has upon banking policies.  A gradual 
downward trend of prices is probable, not because the supply of gold is or will soon 
become inadequate, but merely because the central banks of different countries will 
probably try to maintain their separate hoards of gold.” 
  That same month (January 1929), John Maynard Keynes acknowledged that he had been 
wrong not to take Cassel’s pronouncements more seriously.  Keynes (1929) warned that “a 
difficult, and even a dangerous, situation is developing” because 
“there may not be enough gold in the world to allow all the central banks to feel 
comfortable at the same time. In this event they will compete to get what gold there is – 
which means that each will force his neighbor to tighten credit in self-protection, and that 
a protracted deflation will restrict the world’s economic activity, until, at long last, the 
working classes of every country have been driven down against their impassioned 
resistance to a lower money wage.”   
The recent behavior of the Bank of France “cannot help but cause an artificial shortage of gold,” 
he noted.  “We all survive, and the Bank of England in particular, by favour of the Bank of 
France. . . . The question of the sufficiency of the world’s gold supplies in the abundance or 
scarcity of credit in the world’s business lies, therefore, for the near future in the hands of the 
Bank of France.” 
  By mid-1929, world wholesale prices began to fall and the deflationary spiral had begun.  
In March 1930 testimony before the Macmillan Committee, Keynes argued that the situation was 37 
 
reversible: “If . . . the United States and France were to declare that they would do everything 
reasonably in their power not to take more gold for a year or two, and, if practicable to lose ten 
percent of their present holdings, one would say that, in addition to other expedients, would 
make the position almost safe.  I am absolutely confident that we could bring back the level of 
prices to what it was a couple of years ago.”  However, the problem was that “it is very doubtful 
how far the Bank of France is aware either of the existence of the problem or of the nature of the 
solution” (JMK 20, 154).  The Macmillan Report, largely written by Keynes, called for a 
coordinated reducing in central bank discount rates and the simultaneous reduction in reserve 
requirements (cover ratios) so that a larger credit structure could be built on the existing reserve 
base. 
  British officials at the League of Nations also tried to raise the issue, but it was so 
controversial that the multilateral body was unable to address it head on (Clavin and Wessels 
2004).  The Gold Delegation issued an interim report in September 1930 that largely sidestepped 
the main policy issues.  However, it did conclude that “the problem of the distribution of gold is 
thus one of great importance . . . if the distribution of gold is the result of excessive or abnormal 
competition by a few countries, or if it has the effect of sterilizing important amounts of 
monetary stocks, serious consequences will arise affecting the general level of prices” (League of 
Nations 1930, 17).  It noted that the amount of gold cover against notes and sight liabilities is 
determined by many factors, but that minimum reserves were usually established by national 
legislation.  While no one country could act to reduce its cover ratio, the Delegation suggested 
that international agreement to reduce cover ratios could alleviate the problem of demand for 
monetary gold.  38 
 
  In the fall of 1930, Cassel observed that “recent times have been characterized by a 
relentless struggle for gold rather than by that conscious collaboration, aiming at a limitation of 
demands, which would have been necessary to stabilize the purchasing power of gold.”  Cassel 
stated bluntly what the more diplomatic League of Nations report could not say:  that it was 
“especially remarkable that the Bank of France has consistently and unnecessarily acquired 
enormous amounts of gold without troubling in the least about the consequences that such a 
procedure is bound to have on the rest of the world” (Howe 1934, 65). 
  In September 1931, after Britain faced mounting losses in gold reserves as a result of the 
European financial crisis in mid-1931, Keynes argued that the United States and France were 
“primarily responsible for the disastrous fall in the level of world prices.” 
“The whole world is heartily sick of the selfishness and folly with which the international 
gold standard is being worked.  Instead of being a means of facilitating international 
trade, the gold standard has become a curse laid upon the economic life of the world.  It is 
not necessary to go into academic questions as to how far the fall in the world level of 
prices has been brought about by a worldwide shortage of gold.  It is only necessary to 
look at the present distribution of the world’s gold stocks” (JMK 20, 600).   
Keynes called for an international gold conference to address the issue:  
“This gold conference has to be put forward to America and France as an act of common 
sense and prudence, as a means of saving the economic world from the disaster which 
will surely overtake it if the slump is to be prolonged by a universal deflation policy. . . . 
We must make it plain to our friends on the gold standard that, if they refuse to play the 
game according to the rules, this is not to be made a compelling reason for reducing the 
standard of life in this country for a generation.  If, as a result of the conference’s failure, 39 
 
we were to leave the gold standard system, this would be preferable to the deflation 
policy with which the Coalition Government intends to launch this country in the race for 
economic suicide” (JMK 20, 602-3). 
  In fact, time had run out and Britain left the gold standard just days after Keynes wrote 
this piece.  Keynes (1932, 78, 82-83) called Britain’s ending of the gold standard a “most blessed 
event” and said that “the undermining of the competitive position of the export industries of 
these gold countries will be, in truth, in response to their own request; or, at any rate, a case of 
poetic justice”   
  In lectures at Oxford in 1932, Cassel looked back on the preceding few years and blamed 
the sterilization of gold by the United States and France for the economic disaster.  “The fact that 
the gold-receiving countries failed to use their increasing gold reserves for extending the 
effective supply of means of payment must be regarded as abnormal and, therefore, as an 
independent cause of the fall in prices at the side of the maldistribution of gold,” Cassel (1928, 
70-1) argued.  “The breakdown of the Gold Standard was the result of a flagrant mismanagement 
of this monetary mechanism.”  He rejected the excuses given by French and American 
authorities for their failure to monetize the gold inflows:  “The fact that France and the United 
States have drawn disproportionate quantities of gold to themselves is certainly very disquieting, 
but the defense that is offered for this behavior is still more appalling.”   
  Cassel (1932, 75) was not optimistic that there would be any change in French policy:  
“the great gold accumulation in France is looked upon with so much national satisfaction and 
pride and, in addition, has actually been used for the exercise of so much political power, that 
one cannot but get the impression that France will not readily consent to a reduction of her gold 40 
 
holdings, still less do anything in order positively to further a better international distribution of 
gold.” 
  Ralph Hawtrey (1932, 38) also reflected back on this period:  “I am inclined therefore to 
say that while the French absorption of gold in the period from January 1929 to May 1931 was in 
fact one of the most powerful causes of the world depression, that is only because it was allowed 
to react to an unnecessary degree upon the monetary policy of other countries.” 
  In the United States, George Warren and Frank Pearson (1933, 125) were pushing a 
similar line about the problems with the gold standard:  “The present depression is not an act of 
God for the purification of men’s souls.  It is not a business cycle.  It is not due to extravagant 
living. It is not due to unsound business practices. It is not due to too great efficiency. It is not 
due to lack of confidence, but is the cause of lack of confidence. It is due to high demand for 
gold following a period of low demand for gold.  It teaches the devastating effects of deflation, 
but teaches no other lesson that is good for society.” 
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